T eaching clinical psychiatry to undergraduates and postgraduates can be a daunting process, both for the tutor and the students. For the medical student, the commonest reaction, after an outline of the psychiatric assessment, is "How will I remember to ask all that?"; for the trainee psychiatrist, the question tends to be: "But which bits are important?" This change in response with training reflects, perhaps, a gradual recognition that merely asking the questions is not enough to perform an assessment: there has to be some attempt at creating a coherence, a narrative, in the account one has listened to that has meaning and resonance both for the patient, and for other mental health professionals.
In teaching postgraduate psychiatrists, the bright former medical students become aware of the limitations of just asking everything and repeating it back to the clinical supervisor or examiner. Alongside practical constraints lies the wish that the junior psychiatrist learns the art of the profession. As part of this acculturation, a crucial element is how to organize the material taken in a history such as to be useful for clinical decision making, but also to be able to use it to impart something therapeutically helpful to the patient.
And this is where the frustration lies for those in training: what criteria can one use to determine whether an account of someone's psychiatric history is correct or not? Trainees work with different psychiatrists and different trainers will require different things ("have you asked about bed wetting and thumb sucking in childhood?" or "you should ask everyone about their homosexual fantasies"), which can be disorientating. Trainees, understandably given their desire to progress in their profession, want to know the one clear true way of performing an assessment that all psychiatrists can agree with. In an effort to achieve this, trainees fall into the problem exemplified by the quote above: "But which bits are important?" In trying to protect themselves against the vagaries of different examiners and clinical trainers, they become overinclusive, and disorganized. To help trainees through this, one cannot but reflect on one's own ideas regarding the correctness of the accounts one elicits from one's patients regarding their illness. The tension, as ever in philosophy and psychiatry, is to find a way between naïve ideas of objectivity and those of free-wheeling relativism, a tension that maps onto wider issues between biological psychiatry and the antipsychiatry movement. Elsewhere, the work of John McDowell (1996 McDowell ( , 1998 has been utilized to undercut these dichotomies in psychiatry generally (Thornton 2002) , and in the classification of psychiatric disorders more specifically (Broome 2006) . The intellectual resource that McDowell's work brings to the argument is his recognition that values are at least as objective as 'facts' in the world, and that the idea of a value-free, perspectiveless 'absolute conception of the world' (Williams 1978 (Williams , 1985 is either incoherent or content-less.
In this special issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, rather than utilizing McDowell as a guide to interviewing, I explore a philosophical tradition preoccupied by concerns of value, but one whose influence is almost forgotten, other than as a footnote to the development of Martin Heidegger. This tradition is the school of South West, or Baden, neo-Kantianism. The focus is on Windelband and Rickert, and their predecessor Lotze. These three philosophers stand in a clear unity and progression in addressing a common problem, namely, the role and method of philosophy and the nature and objectivity, of the cultural sciences. As such, the metaphysics of Lotze is utilized by Windelband, who bequeaths the problems that Rickert sets out to solve. Thus, a conceptual coherence and engagement exists that goes beyond a simple historical or temporal grouping. Further, their problem is also ours: how to give a defensible account of singular events and how does one select which pieces of data make up such an account?
The Origins of South West Neo-Kantianism Traditionally, neo-Kantianism has been divided into two 'schools' or movements. One is referred to as the Marburg School and includes figures such as Hermann Cohen (1842 -1918 ), Paul Natorp (1854 -1924 ), Ernst Cassirer (1874 -1945 ), and Nicolai Hartmann (1882 -1951 . The other-the Southwest or Baden School-is our focus here. This group was based in the German universities of the southwest and was inaugurated by Wilhelm Windelband (1848 Windelband ( -1915 at Strasbourg, and continued at Heidelberg, with Heinrich Rickert (1863 -1936 ) and Emil Lask (1875 -1915 at both Heidelberg and Freiberg. The young Martin Heidegger (1889 Heidegger ( -1976 completed his Habilitation with Rickert in 1916. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the question of validity and value was a central and overriding preoccupation for much of German academic philosophy, and in particular that of the South West or Baden school of neo-Kantianism. Validity here refers to either a property of something which is itself a value, or an existent object that either has or exemplifies a value. The debates of the neo-Kantians were not isolated: they occurred to a wider extent in the philosophical community at large and are marked in the concerns of Nietzsche, Scheler, and Weber, as well as the development of Hussserl and of the phenomenological movement. For this period, questions of value were questions of reality, of thought, and of logic rather than of ethics or metaethics. The problem that preoccupied the South West neo-Kantians is the same as that preoccupies the psychiatric trainee: how can one give an objective account of individual events? To broaden it out, Windelband's concern and legacy was to legitimize the social sciences, including history, as sciences with the same standing and rigor as the natural sciences. As will be detailed below, value (Wert) is a concept used as a method, and, further, the method allows demarcation of enquiry and academic fields.
Windelband's work, and the neo-Kantian movement more generally, was inspired by both contemporary readings of Kant that were becoming influential in the time, notably the interpretations of Kuno Fischer and Friedrich Lange, as well as by the work of his teacher Lotze (Hill 2003 ). Lotze's theory of value is essential to comprehend the project of South West neo-Kantianism. It is thus to Lotze we turn first.
Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) was a physician and physiologist who became one of the most prominent philosophers of the nineteenth century in Germany and is credited for nursing the change from German Idealism to the more scientific and positivist model of philosophy that dominated Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Schnädelbach 1984 ). Lotze's philosophical work covered many areas, including philosophy of psychology, biology, thought, and metaphysics. However, his work on values and validity is of most relevance to the discussion here and reinterpreted Idealism as value theory (Schnädelbach 1984) . In Lotze's account, value is a universal, a priori, and objective guiding principle (Pierson 1988) . Values, for Lotze, are 'real' and not a mere subjective response or addition to an otherwise objective reality. Such values, however, present themselves in the form of pleasure or pain, or more generally as some shift in hedonic vector. Values are known through feelings and as such, such feelings serve apodictically as the objective expression of the value of the thing or event in question. Thus, they are real and are known by our feelings. Another key element in Lotze's conceptualization of value is that of its uniqueness: he suggests that not only every individual event or thing is unique, and hence their attendant values, but further the uniqueness of the knower in their appreciation of the value stimuli (Pierson 1988) . Hence, for Lotze, values add to the picture of reality by bringing in notions of worth and purpose to the world, and the importance of things and events for us. Lotze posits that such values have their origin in some quasi-Platonic highest Good, but to us appear as unique, immanent, expressions of real presence because of our finite and constrained knowledge. This is a rather radical twist to the neo-Platonic conflation of the Good with God; for Lotze, there is a dynamism and development present in the relationship between ultimate value and man, and an active role for people as "active value-forming contributors to the ongoing development of worthy reality towards its telos" (Pierson 1988, 121) . Thus, God and supreme value are dynamic, and to some extent, historical and a product of interaction between unique values and individuals. A theory of being is, if true, a theory of morality, of true being and genuine validity. The given world is thus merely the visible aspect of the moral world and of freedom.
To summarize, in Lotze's metaphysics there are two antithetical dimensions for each entity: there is the indifferent dimension of existence, existent objects without value, that in reality can never be separable from the ideal dimension of validity; that is to say, the values that may be exemplified by the object. In combination, these structures account for objective meaning and purpose in the world and as such, Lotze has been referred to as a 'teleological idealist' and espousing a 'universal subjectivity' (Schnädelbach 1984) . Lotze grants that we have an apodictic access to the recognition of objective value in the world through our feelings. Such experiences of value are unique real events but reflect some Highest-Good/God, and there is some interplay between the individual-immanent values and the transcendent-general conception of value, a legacy, perhaps, of Lotze's own Idealism. Lotze's work gives an account of a re-enchanted nature and of a world where values are immanent and omnipresent. His emphasis on the uniqueness of values and the role feeling has in knowing them provides a launch pad for Windelband's notion of the idiographic.
Windelband's Use of Value
So much for speculative metaphysics. Windelband had much more pragmatic goals than Lotze. William Windelband (1848 -1915 was founder of the Baden or South West school of neo-Kantianism and as such defined many of the problems that were to exercise his disciples and descendents, such as Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask, and the young Martin Heidegger. As a group, and together with Dilthey (Bambach 1995) , they sought to reclaim and justify the objectivity of historical research, against idealist Geschictstheologie. The hope was by using a distinct logico-epistemological methodology one could overcome the desire to theorize abstractly about metaphysics and establish and demarcate autonomous sciences and areas of research, such as history, culture, and Geist, which were conceptually distinct from the natural sciences. As such this movement was part of a more general 'crisis' in German philosophy after Hegel, and an attempt at a scientization of philosophy in an attempt to remedy this anxiety. Rather than using philosophy, or phenomenology specifically as Husserl does, to ground all knowledge, Windelband and his colleagues sought to import the methods of natural science into philosophy in an attempt to legitimate the study of history and culture.
Windelband's initial concerns could be in what we might describe as the philosophy of science, and the demarcation between academic disciplines. The Hegelian legacy, reified bureaucratically by the Humboldtian German universities, was such that there were two broad groupings within Wissenschaftslehre: the Naturwissenschaft or sciences of nature and the Geisteswissenschaft or sciences of spirit/mind. Wissenschaft, although typically translated as science, means a rather broader idea that covers any organized technical body of knowledge or discipline, and as such would include philosophy and history, as well as what we would think of as natural science. The Hegelian classification was based around the object of investigation: nature or spirit. This in turn had its roots in Cartesian metaphysics and had become a traditional method of classifying knowledge in German universities. Windelband's attempt to change this was in part motivated by the 'back to Kant' slogan of the neo-Kantians: he sought to bring the methodological clarity Kant had brought to the mathematical and natural sciences to the rapidly expanding and increasingly sophisticated historical and cultural sciences. This reflected the second strand of the neo-Kantian movement: not purely a reactionary return to Kant, but a return to go beyond him and address matters that he did not; to understand Kant is to go beyond him (Oakes 1986 ). Thus, Windelband's goal was to extend the rigor Kant brought to the study of the natural sciences to the cultural sciences.
For Windelband, the possibility of history as a science rests on threes premises: an individualistic conception of value (borrowed from Lotze; see above), a nomological or nomothetic conception of the limits of natural science, and an idiographic or individualistic conception of cultural and historical science. Windelband argues for a shift away from defining areas of scientific enquiry by the objects studied, but instead by the methods employed. For Windelband, the same field can be studied scientifically using two distinct methodologies. If we think back to our trainee psychiatrist troubled by the seeming opposition between a narrative 'folk' psychological method of understanding another, and a scientific explanation provided by cognitive neuroscience, we can perhaps see the idea Windelband promotes. The latter method looks for laws and as such is described as nomothetic; the former is concerned with irreducibly individual events and is termed idiographic.
These are both entirely appropriate methods, but neither is more 'scientific' in the broad sense of term, or more fundamental as a method of studying psychology. The question is whether one wishes to study laws or unique events. Windelband describes his demarcation thus:
[I]n their quest for knowledge of reality, the empirical sciences either seek the general in the form of the law of nature or the particular in the form of the historically defined structure. On the one hand, they are concerned with the form which invariably remains constant. On the other hand, they are concerned with the unique, immanently defined content of the real event. The former disciplines are the nomological sciences. The latter sciences are sciences of process or sciences of the event. The nomological sciences are concerned with what is invariably the case. If I may be permitted to introduce some new technical terms, scientific thought is nomothetic in the former case and idiographic in the latter case. (cited in Bambach 1995) Specifically, however, no actual method or science is purely either idiographic or nomothetic, nor is any scientific datum as such. They are ideal types and designed to assess the rationality and coherence of research rather than expectations of existing in pure actuality. Natural science, at is extreme, has no interest in individual events of concrete reality. Lotze's thought is relevant here because it is essentially the value status of a given event or object that makes it a cultural entity and hence amenable to an idiographic methodology and part of Geisteswissenschaft.
So, for Windelband, he divides up science by method, rather than content or topic. Further, it is the value status of a given event or datum that suggests that it may be amenable to an idiographic analysis. Hence, for most of us, the experience of a fellow human being suffering, and recounting the story of that suffering, is one that we cannot help but see as having validity: it is by the apodictic nature of the feelings invoked in us that reveals that this concrete primordial situation is one that is full of worth, importance, and purpose. And it is the truth of this that then allows an idiographic account to be justified. If we think back to our medical student and psychiatrist, it is their feelings toward their patients that in some sense legitimizes an idiographic approach, the right to try and understand that case as an individual and utterly unique phenomenon.
Windelband argued for objectivity of valuation, but against an objectivity of values. Thus, there are certain states of affair that have an affective hold over us and we value, but the precise mode of valuation may differ from one to another. The idea here is that a given state of affairs necessarily provokes value judgments in all of us; however, the precise nature or type of those judgments may differ. For example, we can both have an engaged response to a character in a novel or history, but whereas you consider him a dashing hero, I regard him as a rake and a scoundrel. That danger for Windelband is that in his attempt to rescue his account from relativism he pushes the problem further back: what if the character in the novel or historical account fails to evoke any concern in us whatsoever? Or rather, we failed to notice him at all? Is the implication that value is a requirement or is constitutive of being aware of something as a distinct entity or event?
Ultimately, Windelband considered valuation primary and thought of truth as a value concept. Thus, the values the true, the good, and the beautiful demarcated the traditional areas of philosophical enquiry of logic, ethics, and aesthetics. For Windelband, purely theoretical judgments are founded on transcendental axiology. It is only against the background of routine, implicit, being-in-the-world, 'coping,' that abstract theoretical concerns can appear. As such truth is not (merely) a logical condition, but a universal value too. Value becomes wedded to logic and Kant's questions regarding ethics, epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics are all related to problems of human value.
Philosophy was, for Windelband, the science of method, the arbiter between conflicting methodologies. Rather like logical positivism, philosophy was to be a gate keeper as to what was science; but, unlike the narrow-minded verificationists, both sides of the gate were scientific, and it was the method, rather than how one could defend one's truth, which determines where the enquiry sat.
Windelband, like the rest of the neo-Kantians, was interested primarily in the formal or logical character of the ideal of historical enquiry: his Kantian concern was the possibility of historical knowledge. For Windelband, the attribution of values must have a 'concrete and singular referent' (Oakes 1986 ). Further, an idiographic idea of science is essential to describe the world we live in; however detailed, precise, and comprehensive a purely nomological account is, it is unable to explain individual events. How idiographic accounts work to explain individual events, however, Windelband, frustratingly, gives only vague and metaphorical answers. Rickert offers an account of how Wissenschaft takes place, through his account of concept formation in both Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft, and hence described how the concepts required to understand individual events may be generated, and it is to him we now turn.
Rickert's Contribution
Heinrich Rickert (1863 Rickert ( -1936 went further than Windelband in trying to show how academic endeavor takes place, and further, how even the work of the pure natural sciences were dependent upon values. For Rickert, there is the real and the unreal (as with Husserl), which equate to the really (spatiotemporally) existent and the ideally existent. Rickert inverts the relationship of Windelband: transcendental normal consciousness, Kant's transcendental apperception, is now a correlate of an objective world of unreal values. Thus, rather than our perception of the world conforming to the faculties of cognition, it is our consciousness that fits the values in the world. Such a move attempts to objectify the valuation of Windelband by linking it to the world and the experience of value. Real objects in the world exemplify such values and as such determine the nature of concrete consciousness. The mind is, on this reading, dependent upon the objective world of value instantiated in real objects. There is, thus, in the work of Rickert, an even greater emphasis on the priority of validity. This train of thought was extended, in the work of Scheler and Hartmann, in attempts to provide a phenomenological objectivism about values.
Rickert, in addition to trying to strengthen his teacher's characterization of the method of the historical and cultural sciences, also undercuts the idea of an objective, value-free natural science. Rickert argues that from the perspective of an objective value-free science, all facts are equal and there are infinitely many. Thus, selection becomes a key issue because science cannot state all the facts; or, for a science to have any determinate content, values must be utilized and to deny their presence is misleading. Science can only begin with the world already as a 'going concern,' with an engaged historical finite researcher, engaged in practices alongside his or her peers and their wider community. Thus, for Rickert, for science to be possible relies on the fact that everyone has similar ideas of objectivity and that there is a commonality of interests in scientific endeavor and to which facts are of interest. This indeed is a commonly shared value that allows the infinite set of facts to be pared down into value-driven subset of facts that will be the subject matter of natural science. Science is necessarily intersubjective for Rickert. It is in his Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (Rickert 1902 (Rickert /1986 ) where Rickert examines the formation of concepts that scientists use so as to select the facts most relevant to their concerns. The concepts scientists employ are used to eliminate and overcome the infinite multiplicity of things. They serve as criteria of characteristics applied to facts for their selection. It is in this selection of concepts one uses to demarcate the facts studied that help to distinguish the types of science.
For Rickert, there are two broad types of concept used in science-general and individual-and these correspond to those used dominantly in natural science and historical science, respectively. These concepts are based on two different principles of fact selection, and each principle is recognized as equally valid. Both are methods of abstraction and part of the logic of science. As with Windelband, it is the method employed, in the case in the formation of concepts, that determines the nature of the science, rather than the object if study per se. For natural science, generalizing concepts are the rule. As such, scientists assume they have overcome the infinite multiplicity of nature in an absolute fashion: on the basis of limited factual information, scientists assert more than they know. This in itself is meta-empirical and not justified by experience. "We, therefore, have to presuppose that just a part of the world informs us about all of it" (cited in Burger 1976, 32) .
Further, general concepts by their nature have to abstract from individual empirical content and thus in their totality do not exhaust all that we which to know.
We may, therefore, straightforwardly say that the logical perfection of a concept in the natural sciences depends on the degree to which empirical concreteness has disappeared from its content. The simplification [of empirical reality] through concept formation goes hand in hand with an annihilation of experienced concreteness. (cited in Burger 1976, 33) Bracketing off what natural science, employing general concept formation, can achieve leaves us with the specific features of particular events, for example, events in history, psychological states, sociological, and cultural data. As such, concrete phenomena different from any other in their uniqueness and individuality. Hence, the domain of the Geisteswissenschaft is determined negatively: it is that which cannot be explained using general concepts, yet even the general concepts of the Naturwissenschaft are only applied to facts which are selected on the basis of the shared values of the researchers.
As in natural science, Geisteswissenschaft will need to employ a concept to determine which facts are of relevance. Rickert suggests that such standards of selection exist. Rickert utilizes the very idea of a value-free nature: for nature, there is no human interference or concern whereas culture is produced by men for valued ends.
A cultural value is either actually accepted as valid by all men, or its validity-and thus the more than individual importance of the object to which it attachesis at least postulated by some civilized human being. . . . It suffices that, in general, the value be connected with the idea of a norm of some good that ought to be actualized. This is what distinguishes cultural objects from those that are, to be sure, valued and striven after by all men, but only instinctively, as well as from those that owe their valuation not, indeed, to mere instinct, but still only to flights of individual fancy or caprice. (Rickert 1962, 22) The subject of the human sciences is marked out by this 'Principle of value-relevance.' By their very nature, such subjects cannot be something indifferent. They have to be valued to be singled out for practical concern and salience. Due to both natural and cultural sciences having concept formation that proceeds in accordance with a valid principle of selection, both, for Rickert, are equally objective. In historical sciences, it is not only the principle to form individual concepts by abstracting from all features of a multitude of causally interrelated concrete phenomena, but also in the uniqueness of their combination representing a culturally significant structure. However, Rickert needs to demonstrate that such selection is not merely a contingent consensus and should have absolute validity.
To do this, Rickert makes the assumption that humans are cultural beings: they recognize the validity of values and make it their collective concern to implement them, to embody them in social products and institutions. Phenomena become value relevant only because these phenomena are embodiments of general cultural values. They embody such values only because certain things were practically valued by empirically existing human individuals.
The individual concrete meaning of [an object] . . . stands in the closest relation to universal concepts of value such that no historically meaningful object, to which we attach individuality, can attain historical meaning and significance without reference to a universal value. The concrete meaning is first 'constituted' historically through the universal value. The concrete meaning that is found in the real objects, as well as in the historical principle of selection, lies not in the sphere of real being but in that of value, and it is from here that the connection between the individual value-related method and the meaningful material of history must be understood. (Bambach 1995, 102) One has to be 'interested' in some way to make any kind of observation. Interest in the general character of things and events guide concept formation in natural science, whereas precise singularity, exemplars, and individuality in contrast motivates the historian. This relates to Rickert's attempt to rescue Windelband: for any knowledge at all, for any observation, or to pick out an event as 'thus and so,' requires interest and hence some kind of valuation. Rickert tries to resist charges of historicism and relativism:
To treat an object as important for values and the realization of cultural goods does not at all mean that one values it, for valuation must always be either positive or negative. The positive or negative value attached to a segment of reality can be a matter of dispute even though its historical significance in virtue of its reference to some value is beyond question. . . . In short, valuations must always involve praise or blame. To refer to values is to do neither. (Bambach 1995, 107) The point Rickert makes here is that it is not the precise content of the valuation that matters for objectivity, but rather, that 'some segment of reality' calls upon us to make a valuation of some kind or another. Hence, referring to values can rescue us from concerns of relativism. This connection between judgements of fact and value, the objectivity of valuation, and the interdependence of two will now be utilized to shed light on the psychiatric assessment.
Neo-Kantianism and Psychiatric Narratives
The South West neo-Kantians attempt to defend the idea that the study of individual events can be considered scientific. Rickert tries to do this in two ways: first, by arguing that studying general laws and the value-free domain of nature can only take place, practically, in the context of a real historical community of investigators whom themselves must choose which facts are worthy of study and of explaining by laws. Hence, although for Rickert the physical world is value free, the study of it can only be perspectival and value driven. Second, he claims, as the quote above demonstrates, certain things have 'validity' despite differing in the vector or degree of valuation. Such things are in the realm of human sciences. However, Rickert does seem to ground this necessity in history: some real, existent, empirical humans must have valued the object. Either we can widen this and think that all objects and events are amenable to an idiographic understanding (e.g., an animistic understanding of the natural world) or limit it to a contingency whereby the realm of validity waxes and wanes through time. This suggestion links back to the Lotzean thought regarding the dynamism and interaction of the highest good and the individual immanent experience of value as well as Heidegger's writing on Being and the metaphysics of technology.
Interestingly, in considering academic psychology both Rickert and Windelband viewed it as a nomothetic and generalizing discipline, akin to the other natural sciences (Schäfer 1999) . However, and as taken up Jaspers and Blakenburg among others, the psychological can be clearly viewed as singular events-individual unique mental events that are not experienced in the same manner repeatedly. As such, they are highly amenable to idiographic analysis, as described. But what can it add? It is perhaps not too unfair to say that in a great deal of psychiatric practice the idiographic mode of thinking about our patients is closed off. One can think of this is many ways: as suggested, in a Lotzean vein, that the dynamism between man and transcendent value in our time is such that we do not feel the suffering of an individual but rather only experience the intellectual interest of the case, or in a Heideggerian account, people have become resources for psychiatric theorizing, an understandable movement in the forgetfulness of Being and the dominance of metaphysics. Less prosaically, the authors of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Classification (Andreason 2007 ) have begun to realize the ethical and epistemological consequences of a focus on classifications. Symptom counting and checklists have become the bedrock of diagnosis and in turn have altered how clinicians view mental illness and patients. What began as a well-intentioned guide to classification, and a spur to research and communication, has become a hegemonic metaphysics that has banished other modes of thinking of psychopathology and determined the scope of what mental illness is.
Neo-Kantianism, as described, offers some strategies that may be of use to allow psychiatry to appreciate the importance of recognizing mental illness as individual, unique, and irreducible. Further, focusing on these very elements are what will protect the interviewer from viewing the patient as nothing more than an instantiation of a category, rather than a primordially real individual. Strengthening such a relationship clearly has moral and therapeutic benefits but also, for our junior psychiatrist, has clear training benefits. Additionally, Rickert's work on the roles values play even in the selection of which facts are studied by a scientific community closes off the possibility of a purely nomothetic generalizing approach. If we think back to our trainee, we can see how these two approaches, and the insights of the neo-Kantians, are employed. If one is interviewing a patient with a probable psychotic disorder, the facts collected will be driven by higher level assumptions: the interviewer will ask questions regarding the epidemiological risk factors for schizophrenia and the neurodevelopmental model (Broome et al. 2005) . Hence, their questions will be around seemingly unconnected parts of the patient's biography, and certainly events distal to the clinical encounter, such as obstetric complications at the time of their birth, their developmental milestones, neurological illnesses, and family history of mental illness. Not only are these data collected in the assessment in a value-driven manner, but the scientific studies were not carried out blindly: they occurred against the background assumption of the research community of schizophrenia as a neurodevelopmental disorder. This is one goal of the assessment; the psychiatrist to elicit the 'scientific' facts that have led to the illness developing. In addition, the psychiatrist has to allow themselves to be open to how patient has responded to events in his or her life, including that of the onset of illness, and the meaning such events have for them. Despite the advances in biological psychiatry, there is no doubt that individual agency can have a profound effect on the development of disorder and its longterm prognosis. Thinking back to the onset of psychosis, individual unique events, such as how an unusual experience is interpreted, can determine whether or not that experience is pathological or not (Broome et al. 2005 ) and can be causally relevant to the onset of illness. Such anomalous experiences are typically affect laden and the interviewer has to allow themselves to think idographically: what is it in this unique event, and how the patient interpreted it, that either allowed them to appraise it in such a way as to minimize the likelihood of them developing psychosis, given all their developmental risk, or appraise it in such a way as to develop a disorder? Here, generalizing nomeothetic tools cannot help us; we have to rely on being able to listen to our patients.
Conclusion
The neo-Kantian idea of values is important in two ways in clinical psychiatry: first, it encourages us to keep certain features of an assessment in focus, those very features that resist law-like generalization and enable the distressed person to remain the key. Second, such a move forces us to remain open to the uniqueness the problems of our patients. This may aid us in making meaningful sense of our patients by our own folk psychology. What is unclear, and is something perhaps for further consideration, is how one accommodates increasingly unusual and unfamiliar psychic states or events into one's accounts of others and how one can be trained to do this, if at all. Many psychiatrists would acknowledge that making a diagnosis and prescribing the correct medication is but an almost entry-level skill for the profession, albeit an important one, but getting used to being with those with severe mental illness, and engaging with them as agents with rational inner lives, is both anxiogenic and a skill that takes time to acquire, is easily denigrated, and relies on practical experience. As with the historians of the nineteenth century, assaulted by the positivistic scientists of their day, whom the neo-Kantians sought to help, we as psychiatrists at the beginning of the twenty-first century need to be reminded that understanding mental illness scientifically, nomothetically, does not obviate one from the duty to work idiographically.
